Abstract
Introduction
The Formal Description Techniques are the base of the automated support in different development activities. The formal specification is an essential tool in the engineering of communications protocols. Using Formal Description Techniques significant improvements can be obtained in the quality, availability in the market and cost of the lifecycle of the product.
The formal models of security have evolved in parallel with the development of the computer systems (software, hardware, operating systems), as well as with the technology and extension of the data networks. Initially, the formal models have treated the problem of control access in individual systems. The criteria of security TCSEC (Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria) of the DoD (Departament of Defense) of the government of USA [1] or the European ITSEC (Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria) [2] criteria are an example of the formalization in the field of secure computer systems. Other examples are the models developed in [3] , [4] , [5] .
The important improvements of the Local Area Networks (LAN) , and their interconnection with remote networks has given birth to new and more sophisticated threats associated with the distribution of the information (eavesdropping, tampering, impersonation, etc) [6] . This has led to the development of new security mechanisms and functions not only to solve the problems of access control to resources in individual systems but also to protect the information in trafic in open systems ( [7] , [8] ). In this case, the Formal Description Techniques (FDT) have been used to specify security protocols and to evaluate the vulnerability of these protocols aganist different attacks. Examples of this type of formal analysis are given in [9] , [10] .
The formal specification makes it possible to verify, to validate and to implement communications protocols in an efficient way before the development of a software product. However, the use of Formal Description Techniques (ESTELLE, LOTOS, SDL etc) in the specification of security protocols implies a series of additional considerations that are not taken into account in the conventional specifications of communications protocols [11] .
A great effort has been carried out with unquestionable success in the development of Techniques of Formal Description (TDF) for the verification, validation and implementation of communications protocols. However, a parallel effort has not been carried out in the development of formal techniques that make the analysis, verification and implementation of security protocols. In this work we present the results obtained from the development of the L.E.I. (Logical Element of Implementation) an additional layer in the TCP/IP architecture will be able both to interpret and to implement any security protocol from its formal specification. Our solution makes it possible to automate the implementation of security protocols, starting from formal specifications and with it, the versatility in the incorporation of different security services in a distributed environment. In definitive we have developed a system that has the following features:
• It specifies in an appropriate way the necessary exchanges among the entities that correspond to a security protocol. We have conceived a formal specification of a security protocol that is sufficiently clear and concise to allow you to derive the finite state machine that constitutes the security protocol: the formal specification supports the generation of a real implementation of the protocol.
• It generates a real implementation of the specified protocol starting from its formal specification. Our solution provides an Applications Programming Interfaz (API) for the development of distributed applications with security services.
• It allows the versatility in the incorporation of services of security. Not alone they can be configured to the user customized or organizations but rather they can be modified in a dynamic way in any moment.
Formal specification of security protocols
The syntax and semantics contemplated in the definition of a Formal Specification of a security protocol appears in [14] . Our system provides a syntactic analyzer to verify the syntax of a formal specification. The design of this specification, carried out according to the requirements exposed in [12] 
An example of a formal specification, is represented in Fig. 1 . In this case we have specified a variant of the wellknown Needhman-Schroeder protocol [13] . In this example "KPA" and "KPB" are respectively the symmetric keys shared betwen the entities a and c and the entities b and c. 
Logical Element of Implementation (L.E.I.)
The Logical Element of Implementation (L.E.I.) is a code responsible for the automatic implementation of the security protocol formally specified. The Logical Element of Implementation goes beyond a simple implementation of a security protocol. The Logical Element of Implementation is able to create the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the establishment of secure communications among applications that support the TCP/IP architecture and to automate the process of implementation of security protocols starting from a formal specification.
Innovation of the Implementation System
The developed infrastructure is able to incorporate different security protocols dynamically to a communication among TCP/IP applications. It has been achieved that the pair entities in a distributed environment interpret a specification of a security protocol and that, therefore, only have one code independently of the specific security protocol: Traditionally, the implementation of a security protocol (as any communications protocol) implied the implementation of a specific code in each of the participant entities ( [14] , [15] ). In this work, it has been possible to develop an infrastructure in which the pair entities have the necessary functionalities to interpret any protocol.
To understand the innovation that implies the automatic interpretation of a formal specification we will compare this idea with the common conception of implementation of protocols. Traditionally the implementation of a protocol had been carried out generating an independent code in each one of the participant entities. This way the different functionalities associated with each entity for that protocol are completed. Consequently, if a different protocol had to be implemented, a new code that should also be different for each entity would be needed.
The software infrastructure developed in the Logical Element of Implementation makes it possible to implement any security protocol with only one code of interpretation of protocols located in each participant entity. Each of the entities will have to know which is its behavior in function of the formal specification of the protocol. In Fig. 2 this idea is described. In our model, with only one code of interpretation of protocols the entities are able to implement any security protocol. The benefits of this scheme are relevant when offering security services dynamically both to the applications and users.
In Fig. 3 the new security level developed by the Logical Element of Implementation on the TCP/IP architecture is shown. This security level will be the one in charge of offering at the superior level (application level) a group of functions (primitives) for the establishment of secure communications among applications in the TCP/IP architecture. 
Implementation Process
The structure of the application created by the Logical Element of Implementation (L.E.I.) is composed of three entities: Client (or entity A), Server (or entity B) and Authentication Server (or entity C). In the Fig. 4 the structure of the application developed by L.E.I. is described. 
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Figure 4. Structure of the application developed by the Logical Element of Implementation
Our method to implement security protocols consists of two phases: In a first phase, the distribution of the formal specification of the security protocol to implement, for initiative of one of the entities, takes place. In principle it is the beginner entity the one that decides the security protocol to use. A third entity, the Authentication Server is the one in charge of distributing in a secure way the chosen specification to the participant entities. In a second phase, the interpretation and, consequently, the implementation of the security protocol takes place.
Each of the three participant entities has a unique common code of interpretation of protocols that carries out two essential functions: Distribution of formal specifications and implementation of security protocols. Each of the participant entities will be able, starting from the obtainment of the formal specification, of completing their mission specified inside that protocol. In this environment the exchanges defined in the formal specification of a security protocol will take place. 
Specification 1: Formal specification of test nº1
In this simple example we have a security protocol of two exchanges. In the first of them the entity a sends to the entity b a variable "KPA". This variable has associated in the module RELATIONS the function "public_key(A,KPA:A)". This means that the variable "KPA" is the public key of entity a that will be generated by the own entity. In fact, the entity a it will generate a pair key private/public key that will store in a Chart of Variables for if it was necessary to use them later on the construction of some message of the security protocol. Once obtained and stored the keys according to the specification of the protocol the entity a will send to the entity b their public key "KPA". The entity b will receive through its sockets interfaz the message 1 in the one that will identify to "KPA" like the public key of the entity a and it will store it in its Chart of Variables.
In the message 2 the entity b will build the message 2. This message contains an encryption pattern ("encrypt(KPA,KS)"). Traveling the encryption pattern the entity b determines that it has to encrypt with the public key of entity a "KPA" a variable "KS". Now then, the variable "KS" has associate a relationship "sesion_key(KS:B)". This means that "KS" is a session key that has to generate the entity b aleatorily. In this case the interpretation process it consists, in the first place, on the generation of the session key "KS" and later on encrypt this key with the public key of entity a "KPA".
Finally, the entity a will receive the message 2 for its sockets interfaz in which will be able to identify a encryption pattern, which will be incorporate automatically to its Chart of Variables. The entity a will identify that this pattern has been encrypted with its public key and, consequently, it will have to decrypted it with its dual private key. Once decrypted it will know how to identify to "KS" like the session key that it will store in their Chart of Variables. In this moment the implementation process will have finished.
The Charts of Variables used by the entities allow to speed up the interpretation process and composition of the messages. In our example the charts generated in the entities a and b would be those of the charts 1 and 2 ( Tables 1 and 2 
Results
The results presented in this section refers to the execution time of three security protocols in different communication networks. These protocols, that have been specified and implemented using LEI, are an example of three proposals of security to incorporate to distributed applications. Each one of the proposed specifications incorporates progressively more security functions and mechanisms that make more complex the task of automatic implementation. 
Specification 3: Formal Specification of test nº3
Notice that in the formal specification 1 two entities (a and b) participate, while in the formal specification 2 and 3 three entities participate (a, b and c). The tests have been carried out on commonly used conmunication networks. Firstly, the tests were made in a Ethernet Local Area Network (10 MBps) . In second place, they have been carried out in Wide Area Networks, concretely, using Frame Relay and X.25 protocols. For it, routers with the different configurations has been used, in particular, with the following speeds in the line: Frame Relay (2 Mbps and 64 Kbps.); X.25 (2 Mbps, 64 Kbps.)
To finish, tests on the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) have been also carried out. The tests have been carried out with configurations of one channel B (64 Kbps) and two channels B (128 Kbps). The topology of the Network used is as follows (Fig. 5) 
